The objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency consequences of monopoly from the perspective of an efficiency-wage model based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . An important innovation of our model is that a firm can raise the probability that a shirking worker is detected by increasing its effort or investment in the monitoring of workers. By comparing with the competitive equilibrium we find that monopoly is associated with higher unemployment rate and less monitoring. Surprisingly, however, monopoly is not necessarily dominated by perfect competition in terms of economic efficiency.
Introduction
It is well-known that monopoly causes inefficient allocation of resources. Traditionally, deadweight losses, productive inefficiencies and rent seeking activities are cited as reasons for efficiency losses of monopoly. However, there is one area of potential efficiency losses of monopoly that so far has rarely been explored in microeconomic theory, that is, the effects of monopoly on unemployment. Given that output is an increasing function of labor, reduction in output by a monopoly will normally cause a reduction in labor employed. Therefore, it seems plausible that monopoly cause higher rate of unemployment.
On the other hand, however, the effect of monopoly on economic efficiency, if taking unemployment into consideration, is not that clear and has not been studied deeply in microeconomic theory. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency consequences of monopoly from the perspective of an efficiency wage model of unemployment based on Shapiro and Stiglitz [1] . In this model a monopolist has to offer a wage high enough to induce workers to expend efforts on the job. An important feature of our model is that a monopolist can raise the probability of shirking detection by increasing its effort or investment in the monitoring of workers 1 . Using this model we find that monopoly does not necessarily lead to lower welfare level than perfect competition. This result is surprising in light of the common belief about the welfare losses of monopoly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and compares the monopoly equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the welfare consequence of monopoly and presents the main results from simulations. And conclusions are in section 4.
The Model
Consider an industry served by a monopolist 2 , whose objective is to maximize profits. The demand for the good produced by the monopolist is represented by To incorporate unemployment into the model, we use the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz [1] . Specifically, we assume that workers may shirk (i.e. exerting no effort) on the job. The firm, however, cannot perfectly observe workers' effort. In other words, if a worker shirks, there is some probability, denoted by q, that the worker will be caught and fired. In the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model, the detection probability q is taken as exogenous. In our model, we endogenize q by assuming that q is a function of the effort and/or investment by the firm in monitoring the workers,
, where m denotes the monitoring level.
To discourage workers from shirking, the firm has to pay a wage high enough (i.e. the efficiency wage or nonshirking wage):
where, 0 w  is the unemployment benefit received by an unemployed worker; a denotes the job acquisition rate, b is the natural separation rate and r represents the intertemporal discount rate.
Taking the efficiency wage into consideration, the monopolist's optimization problem is written as: 
Then the first order conditions for Equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
Equilibriums in the product and the labor markets require that
Then the first order conditions for Equation (6) can be rewritten as: Note that the comparison of Equations (4) and (7) 
Since the quantity produced is an increasing function of employment, Proposition 3 in turn implies that the monopolist produces a smaller output and accordingly sets a higher price than a competitive firm. On the surface, these effects of monopoly appear to be the same as in the standard monopoly case. However, there are more factors at play in this model. Intuitively, a monopolist has a tendency to restrict output because it faces a downward sloping demand curve. As a result of this tendency, employment level falls, which tends to push down the non-shirking wage. In our model this has an additional effect because it induces the monopolist to reduce the level of monitoring, causing a further fall in employment.
Welfare Effects of Monopoly
Given that this is a partial equilibrium model, we use the total surplus as the measure of welfare. Note that compared with the standard textbook model of monopoly, we have an additional group of agents in our model, the workers. In principle, the measure of total welfare should also take into consideration the utility of workers. This raises an additional issue of how to treat the unemployment benefits: 1) If the unemployment benefits are financed by lump sum taxes on consumers, they are merely a wealth transfer and as such should not be included in the total surplus;
2) Alternatively, if there are no government transfer payments and the unemployment benefits merely represent the value that an unemployed worker obtain from home production, the unemployment benefits should be included in the total surplus;
3) In addition, the conventional measure of total surplus that takes into consideration the welfare of consumers and the firms only (i.e. excluding the workers).
Our welfare analysis in what follows uses the first type of total surplus 5 :
It is easy to obtain we have analyzed the efficiency and employment conthat takes into account the firm's choice of monitoring, we have analyzed the efficiency and employment consequences of monopoly in the presence of unemployment caused by efficiency wage considerations. We have
shown that in addition to a smaller output and a higher price, monopoly also leads to higher unemployment rate than the competitive equilibrium. It is worth noting that the effect of monopoly on total welfare, however, is ambiguous. Numerical simulations of the model indicate that under certain range of parameter values, monopoly generates higher total surplus than perfect competition. Therefore, by introducing an additional distortion (i.e. unemployment) into the model, it is no longer the case that monopoly is always dominated by perfect competition in terms of economic efficiency.
